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Over the past several decades, we have witnessed the emergence of many new infectious agents, some 
of which are major public threats. New and emerging infectious diseases which are both transmissible 
from patient-to-patient and virulent with a high mortality include novel coronaviruses (SARS-CoV, MERS-
CV), hemorrhagic fever viruses (Lassa, Ebola), and highly pathogenic avian influenza A viruses, A(H5N1) 
and A(H7N9). All healthcare facilities need to have policies and plans in place for early identification of 
patients with a highly communicable diseases which are highly virulent, ability to immediately isolate 
such patients, and provide proper management (e.g., training and availability of personal protective equip-
ment) to prevent transmission to healthcare personnel, other patients and visitors to the healthcare facility. 
DrWilliam Stewart, U.S. Surgeon General, is alleged to have said
in the late 1960s, “it is time to close the book on infectious dis-
eases, and declare the war against pestilence won.”1 This widely
repeated statement turned out to be an urban legend and never to
have been said.2 However, the “belief that infectious diseases had
been successfully overcomewas pervasive in the biomedical circles—
including among a Nobel Laureate, medical Dean, and other thought
leaders—from as early as 1948, and extending into the mid-1980s.”2
The discovery that the 1976 outbreak of pneumonia (Legion-
naires’ disease) was caused by a newly described bacteria, Legionella
spp, was an awakening call for public health and infection control
professionals.3,4 The first reports of the disease later known as AIDS
in 19785,6 and the discovery of the virus that causes AIDS,7 now
known as HIV, in 1983 further demonstrated that infectious dis-
eases would continue to be amajor source of morbidity andmortality
for patients. Importantly, although Legionella spp turned out not to
be a new human pathogen but one that had caused human dis-
eases for centuries, HIV was a new pathogen to humans, and its
origin was traced to simian immunodeficiency viruses in primates.8
The public health threats posed by emerging diseases have been
well described in 2 reports from the Institute of Medicine, one in
1992 and one in 2001.9,10 Since the discovery of Legionella and HIV,
many emerging infectious diseases have had important infection
control implications. This review will focus on several of the most
important threats, including novel coronaviruses (severe acute re-
spiratory disease [SARS] and Middle East respiratory syndrome
[MERS]), hemorrhagic viruses (Lassa, Ebola), and novel influenza
viruses, and the infection control strategies required to mitigate the
associated public health threat posed by these viruses.
EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES
Definitions
The World Health Organization defines an emerging infectious
disease as “one that has appeared in the population for the first time,
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or that may have existed previously but is rapidly increasing inci-
dence or geographic range.”11 The Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) define emerging infectious diseases as follows12:
• New infections resulting from changes in or evolution of ex-
isting organisms.
• Known infections spreading to new geographic areas or
populations.
• Previously unrecognized infections appearing in areas under-
going ecologic transformation.
• Old infections re-emerging as a result of antibiotic resistance
in known agents or breakdowns in public health measures.
Factors in the emergence of infectious diseases
In 1985,Wilson described the basic concepts in infectious disease
emergence as follows13:
• Emergence of infectious diseases is complex.
• Infectious diseases are dynamic.
• Most new infections are not caused by genuinely new pathogens.
• Agents involved in new and re-emergent infections cross tax-
onomic lines to include viruses, bacteria, fungi, protozoa, and
helminths.
• The concept of the microbe as the cause of disease is inade-
quate and incomplete.
• Human activities are the most potent factors driving disease
emergence.
• Social, economic, political, climactic, technologic, and environ-
mental factors shape disease patterns and influence emergence.
• Understanding and responding to disease emergence require a
global perspective, conceptually and geographically.
• The current global situation favors disease emergence.
An important concept listed by Wilson is that most new and
emerging infections are zoonotic diseases that have jumped taxo-
nomic lines to infect humans. Of the approximately 1,400 known
human pathogens, 58% are zoonotic, including 73% of the 117 that
meet the definition for emerging or re-emerging infectious
pathogens.14 Importantly, all of the pathogens that are the focus of
this article are zoonotic. A more complete list of pathogens con-
sidered to have emerged via a species jump have been published.15
Karesh et al have reviewed how zoonotic diseases result from natural
pathogen ecology and how other circumstances, such as animal
production, extraction of natural resources, and antimicrobial ap-
plication, change the dynamics of disease exposure to human
beings.16 The stages in emergence of pandemic zoonotic diseases
have also been reviewed.17-19 Morse et al described 3 stages in emer-
gence of zoonotic diseases: (1) pre-emergence (encroachment into
wildlife habitat and change in land use); (2) localized emergence
(expansion of the wildlife–human being interface, for example Ebola
virus); and (3) pandemic emergence (international travel, for example
SARS, HIV and AIDS).18 Pike et al described 5 stages in zoonotic
disease emergence: (1) exclusive to animals; (2) primary human in-
fections only; (3) limited human-to-human transmission; (4)
sustained human-to-human transmission; and (5) exclusive to
humans.17
The 1992 Institute of Medicine report on microbial threats listed
the factors in infectious disease emergence as follows: (1) ecolog-
ical changes, including those caused by economic development and
land use (agriculture: dams, changes in water ecosystems;
deforestation/reforestation; flood-drought; famine; climate changes);
(2) human demographics and behavior (societal events: popula-
tion growth andmigration; war or civil conflicts; urban decay; sexual
behavior; intravenous drug use; use of high-density facilities); (3)
international travel and commerce (worldwide movement of goods
and people; air travel); (4) technology and industry (globalization
of food supplies; changes in food processing and packaging; organ
or tissue transplantation; drugs causing immunosuppression; wide-
spread use of antibiotics); (5) microbial adaptation and change
(microbial evolution, response to selection in the environment); and
(6) breakdown in public health measures (curtailment or reduc-
tion in prevention programs; inadequate sanitation and vector control
measures).9,20 A more recent article listed the following factors as
influencing new and re-emerging infections: exotic pets, exotic foods
(eg, bush meat), companion animals, alterations in livestock man-
agement, acquisition of new virulence factors, pathogen adaptation
to new host species, changes in land use, tourism, translocation of
infected animals or persons, and climate changes influencing
arthropods.21
EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES OF INFECTION
CONTROL IMPORTANCE
Overview
In the last 35 years, many emerging infectious diseases of in-
fection control importance have been described (Table 1).22-24
Table 1
Selected emerging diseases of infection control importance
Disease (initial







Legionnaires’ disease Unknown (thousands) Endemic and epidemic No No High 1976-present
HIV (Africa) Millions (thousands) Ongoing epidemic Yes (blood exposure, organ
transplantation, vertical, sexual)
Yes (blood exposure) Moderate 1978-present




West Nile fever (Thousands) Endemic Yes (blood transfusions, vertical,
organ transplantation)
No* Low 1999
SARS (China) ~8,000 (8) Controlled Yes (droplet, contact, airborne?) Yes High 2003-2004




Yes (droplet, contact) Yes† High 2003
MERS (Middle East) Thousands (2) Controlled Yes (droplet, contact) Yes High 2014-present
Ebola (West Africa) Thousands (4) Controlled United
States, reduced Africa
Yes (contact, sexual) Yes High 2014-present
HCP, health care personnel; MERS, Middle East respiratory syndrome; SARS, severe acute respiratory syndrome; vCJD, variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease.
*Infection via a needlestick theoretically possible.
†No HCP developed infection during the U.S. outbreak but patient-to-HCP transmission described in Africa.
Diseases of infection importance included Legionella,25 HIV, variant
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease,26 West Nile virus disease,27 SARS,
monkeypox,28 MERS, and Ebola virus disease (EVD). These dis-
eases are of infection control importance because they are spread
person-to-person (HIV, SARS, monkeypox, MERS, and EVD), health
care personnel (HCP) may be at substantial risk of acquiring infec-
tion during patient care (HIV, SARS, monkeypox, MERS, and Ebola),
they may be transmitted by blood transfusions (HIV, variant
Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, andWest Nile virus), or they have the po-
tential to cause outbreaks in health care facilities (Legionella, SARS,
MERS, and EVD). Screening of donated blood has largely elimi-
nated transmission of HIV and West Nile via blood transfusions.
Interestingly, although most of the emerging diseases are endemic
in lesser developed countries, 5 developed countries (United States,
United Kingdom, Australia, Japan, and Germany) accounted for the
most reports of emerging disease events.29
The emergence of anti-infective resistance among microbes has
also been an emerging threat in U.S. health care facilities. The most
importantmicroorganisms have includedmethicillin-resistant Staph-
ylococcus aureus,30 vancomycin-resistance enterococci,31 extended-
spectrum β-lactamase–producing enteric gram-negative bacilli
(especially Escherichia coli, Klebsiella, and Enterobacter),32 and
carbapenem-resistance Enterobacteriaceae.33 Pathogens with en-
hanced virulence in recent years have included Clostridium difficile
(BI/NAP1/027)34 and norovirus (GII.4 strains).35 Also of concern are
continued outbreaks of vaccine-preventable diseases, mumps36 and
measles,37 and the resurgence of pertussis.38
Key considerations in assessing and managing the threat of emerging
infectious diseases in health care facilities
Assessing and managing the threat of an emerging infectious
disease requires an understanding of the biology of the pathogen,
its epidemiology, the clinical manifestations of infection, themethods
of diagnosis, and therapies (if available). In addition, there are a
number of issues more specific to infection control (Table 2). Key
information on the infectious diseases discussed in detail in this
article is provided in Table 3.
All health care facilities should have a highly communicable
disease management plan (Table 4). A detailed discussion of each
of these components is beyond the scope of this article. Detailed
information is best found, especially early in an epidemic, on the
Web pages of local and state health departments, the Centers of
Disease Control and Prevention, and the World Health Organiza-
tion. General recommendations have been provided by infection
control experts.39-44 There are 2 areas that place a health care fa-
cility and the personnel at substantial risk for disease acquisition
and transmission. First, inadequate screening procedures when pa-
tients enter a health care facility can potentially allow transmission
from an ill patient to HCP, other patients, or visitors. Second, inad-
equate supplies of personal protective equipment (PPE) or inadequate
training of HCP in proper donning and doffing procedures can in-
crease the risk of exposure for HCP.
Another important issue is the use of an appropriate antiseptic
for hand hygiene and an appropriate surface disinfectant. However,
once the nature of the emerging disease is known (ie, bacteria,
nonenveloped virus, enveloped virus), it is possible to determine
the proper antiseptic and disinfectant, even in the absence of studies
of the exact infectious agent.45 For example, an enveloped virus (eg,
Lassa, EVD, MERS-CoV, SARS-CoV, influenza A) would be inacti-
vated by any agent active against vegetative bacteria, nonenveloped
viruses, or mycobacteria. Any vegetative bacteria would be inacti-
vated by an agent active against a nonenveloped virus or
mycobacteria. It is important to remember that alcohol has reduced
activity against nonenveloped viruses (eg, norovirus) and no activ-
ity against spores (eg, C difficile).
EMERGING INFECTIOUS DISEASES OF SPECIAL INTEREST
Lassa fever
Microbiology
Lassa fever is a single-strand negative RNA virus belonging to
the Arenaviridae family.46,47 The family is serologically divided into
2 major complexes: the OldWorld complex (eg, Lassa virus, Mobala
virus) and the NewWorld complex (eg, Junin virus, Machupo virus,
Sabia virus). With the exception of the lymphocytic choriomenin-
gitis virus, all virus species show a restricted geographic occurrence.
The host for Lassa fever is the multimammate rat (Mastomys
natalensis).
Epidemiology
Lassa fever is endemic in Sub-Saharan West Africa, including
Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea, and Nigeria. It is estimated that the
number of Lassa virus infections per year is West Africa is 100,000-
300,000, with approximately 5,000 deaths. Transmission of Lassa
virus to humans occurs most commonly through ingestion or in-
halation of the virus.Mastomys rodents shed the virus in urine and
droppings, and direct contact with these materials through touch-
ing soiled objects, eating contaminated food, or exposure to nonintact
skin can lead to infection. Person-to-person transmission may occur
after exposure to virus in the blood, tissue, secretions, or excre-
tions of a Lassa virus–infected individual. Nosocomial transmission
has been common in health care settings where proper PPE or train-
ing in the correct use of PPE was not available.
The incubation period ranges from 6-21 days.
Outbreaks
In 1969, 3 American missionary nurses became ill in Lassa,
Nigeria. Two Yale University laboratory workers studying the disease
also became sick. Two of the nurses and one laboratory worker died
Table 2
Key considerations in assessing and managing the threat of an emerging infectious
disease in health care facilities
Pathogen








• Infectivity (ie, communicability)




• Risk factors for acquisition of infection
• Morbidity
• Mortality
• Risk factors for morbidity and mortality
• Diagnostic methods (sensitivity, specificity, biosafety)





• Recommended personal protective equipment
• Pre-exposure prophylaxis (availability, efficacy, safety)
• Postexposure prophylaxis (availability, efficacy, safety)
• Recommended biosafety level in the laboratory
• Recommended waste disposal (liquids and solids)
from what was later identified as Lassa fever.48 Since then, multi-
ple cases of imported Lassa fever have been reported in Europe.49
In addition, multiple imported cases have been reported in the United
States.50-53 Themost recent imported case in the United States, which
occurred in May 2015, died from his infection.
Since the first description of Lassa fever in 1969, nosocomial
transmission has emerged as a prevalent mode of acquisition of
infection.49 The largest nosocomial series occurred in Nigeria in 1989,
involving 34 cases, including 9 HCP, with a 55% attack rate among
patients and a 65% overall fatality rate.54
Clinical manifestations
The clinical manifestations of Lassa fever include the gradual onset
of fever, nausea, abdominal pain, severe sore throat, cough, con-
junctivitis, ulceration of the buccal mucosa, exudative pharyngitis,
and cervical adenopathy.40 Late complications include severe swell-
ing of the head and neck and pleural and pericardial effusions.
Hemorrhagic complications are less common. Most infections are
subclinical or mild, but up to 20% of cases are severe. Importantly,
it may be difficult to differentiate Lassa fever from other hemor-
rhagic fevers in the first 3-7 days of illness because they all present
with a similar, influenza-like illness and lack pathognomonic
features.55
The overall case fatality rate is approximately 1%, but the ob-
served case fatality rate among hospitalized patients is 15%-20%.
The disease is especially severe late in pregnancy, with maternal
death or fetal loss occurring in >80% of cases during the third tri-
mester. Deafness occurs in 25% of patients who survive the disease
but may return within 1-3 months in half of those affected.
Lassa fever is most often diagnosed using an enzyme-linked
immunosorbent assay. Real-time polymerase chain reaction (PCR)
can be used in the early stage of the disease. Intravenous ribavirin
has been used successfully to treat patients with Lassa fever. It is
most effective when used early in the course of illness. Convales-
cent plasma has also been used as therapy.
Infection control issues
Patients with Lassa fever should be placed in a single room on
special isolation precautions similar to that used for patients with
EVD (Table 4). HCP should wear appropriate PPE similar to that used
when caring for patients with EVD, including a full body protec-
tive suit with hood, cover gown, 2 sets of gloves, N95 respirator, and
face shield or goggles. No published data on environmental surviv-
al or germicide susceptibility are available. However, as an enveloped
virus, it is likely susceptible to quaternary ammonium com-
pounds, phenolics, and alcohol.45 Lassa virus is considered a class
IV biosafety agent; patient samples should only be handled by trained
staff and processed in suitably equipped laboratories.
There is currently no vaccine that protects against Lassa fever.
There is no evidence to support the role of ribavirin as postexposure
prophylaxis for Lassa fever.56
EVD
Microbiology
Ebola is caused by a nonsegmented, single-strand negative RNA
virus of the family Filoviridae.40,57,58 There are 5 identified Ebola virus
species, 4 of which are known to cause disease in humans: Zaire,
Sudan, Tai Forest (formerly Cote d’Ivoire), and Bundibugyo. The fifth,
Reston virus, has caused disease in nonhuman primates, but not in
humans.
The natural reservoir host of Ebola virus remains unknown.
However, the detection of antibodies against Ebola and Ebola virus
Table 3
Key infection control information for selected highly communicable emerging infectious diseases
Characteristic Lassa fever Ebola virus disease MERS SARS Novel influenza A
Virus
Year identified 1969 1976 2012 2003
Family Arenaviridae Filoviridae Coronaviridae Coronaviridae Orthomyxoviridae
Genome RNA RNA RNA RNA RNA
Coat Enveloped Enveloped Enveloped Enveloped Enveloped
Epidemiology
Endemic location West Africa West and Central Africa Middle East China Worldwide (location
varies with strain)
Prevalence 100,000-300,000 cases per
year
No recent human cases Varies by strain
Reservoir Rodent (rat) Bats (fruit) Bats, camels
(intermediate host)
Bats, palm civet Migratory birds, pigs





Droplet, contact, airborne Inhalation, contact
Incubation period (d) 10 (range, 6-21) 6-12 (range, 2-21) 2-15 2-14 (range, 2-21) Varies by strain
Infectivity, Rho Not determined 1.5-2.0 0.3-1.3 2.2-3.7 (range, 0.3-4.1) Varies by strain
Duration, maximum (d) 28 21
Case fatality rate 15%-20%, hospitalized
patients
~50% (range, 25%-90%) >35% ~10%
Biologic safety
Biothreat level A A Not specified C C (some strains)
Biosafety level 4 4 3 3 2-3
Clinical
Therapy Ribavirin Supportive Supportive Supportive Neuraminidase
inhibitors
Infection control
Isolation Contact, droplet, airborne for
aerosol-generating
procedures
Contact, droplet, airborne for
aerosol-generating
procedures





No No No No Yes (some strains)
Postexposure prophylaxis No No No No Yes (antivirals)
fragments in fruit and insectivore bats are highly suggestive that
these animals serve as a reservoir.
Epidemiology
Past Ebola outbreaks have occurred in West and Central Africa,
including the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Uganda, Sudan, and
Gabon.59-61 Single cases caused by laboratory accidents have also been
reported from Russia and England.
Once the virus enters the human population, transmission is sus-
tained via person-to-person spread, which is enhanced by the lack
of active case finding with isolation or quarantine. The incubation
period of Ebola is generally 8-10 days (range, 2-21 days). Infection
has been transmitted only from symptomatic persons.58
Ebola is transmitted person-to-person through direct contact (ie,
nonintact skin, via mucous membrane contact) with blood, body
fluids (eg, urine, saliva, sweat, feces, vomit, breast milk, semen) of
an ill person, objects (eg, needles, syringes) that have been con-
taminated with body fluids from an ill person, or infected fruit bats
or primates. More recently, the sexual transmission of this virus has
been recognized in Liberia. Recently, cases have been reported in
which persons who had recovered from EVD developed recrudes-
cent infection with Ebola virus being recovered from protected body
locations, such as eyes and central nervous systems. Ebola is not
transmitted through the air or by water. However, in Africa, it may
be acquired by handling bushmeat and contact with infected bats.
HCP have been a substantial risk for acquiring Ebola through patient
care.59 TheWorld Health Organization reported (September 23, 2015
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/ebola/situation-reports/archive/
en/) that since the start of the epidemic in 2014 a total of 881
confirmed cases have occurred in health care providers (fromGuinea,
Liberia, and Sierra Leone), with 513 reported deaths (58%). HCP in
the United States have acquired Ebola during the current outbreak.
Outbreaks
The first recognized outbreaks of Ebola occurred in West Africa
in 1976. In the 40 years since the initial outbreaks in Zaire and Sudan,
Table 4
Preparedness for managing a highly communicable emerging infectious disease
General
• Have a comprehensive facility plan for managing a highly communicable emerging infectious disease.
• Nestle the plan for emerging infectious diseases within the general disaster plan.
• Base the plan on the route(s) of transmission for the infectious agent.
• Incorporate the incident command structure in the plan.
• Periodically train key personnel on the plan.
• The plan should include care of single patients (eg, Ebola) and managing large number of patients in an epidemic (eg, novel influenza).
• Incorporate communications with local and state health department officials.
Screening and signage (when appropriate based on the threat of a highly communicable disease)
• Place signs at every entrance to the hospital and clinics that includes the following: epidemiologic clues to possible disease exposure (ie, travel locations), signs
and symptoms of infection, and who to notify if the patient or visitor has both exposure and appropriate signs or symptoms.
• Include messaging about the signs and symptoms of the concerning disease in all telephone contacts with the patient (eg, reminders about appointments) and
who to contact prior to arrival at the health care facility.
• Screen all patients immediately at the time of all health care visits.
• Include screening in the electronic medical record (also have alerts in the medical record that require screening).
• Place an appropriate isolation sign on the door of all patients being isolated because of the possibility of a highly communicate disease.
• For diseases transmitted via the droplet or airborne routes emphasize respiratory hygiene (ie, immediate use of a mask and proper disposal of tissues).
• Emphasize the need for proper hand hygiene.
• All messaging should be in appropriate languages for the region.
Triage
• Train frontline person in all clinics and the emergency department in appropriate use of personal protective equipment.
• Have appropriate personal protective equipment available.
• Have a designated location in the emergency department and all clinics in which to immediately place the patient (a private room; ideally with access to a sink
and toilet, and if possible, one that meets standards for a disease transmitted by the airborne route (ie, negative pressure, out-exhausted air, >12 air exchanges per
hour) if applicable.
• For diseases transmitted by the airborne route and when an airborne isolation room is not available, ideally place a portable high-efficiency particulate air purifier
in the room.
• Have a well-defined process for alerting key health care facility officials about the presence of a patient with a possible highly communicative disease (eg, disaster
manager, infection preventionist).
• Avoid blood tests or other procedures that may place the laboratory staff or other health care personnel at risk.
• Have a well-defined and safe method for transporting a patient either to a properly equipped emergency department or hospital facility able to safely care for a
patient.
Inpatient care
• Have a well-defined plan for the inpatient location that will provide care to a patient with a highly communicative disease (or a plan for transporting such a
patient to facility that can provide such care).
• In the inpatient care unit designate areas that are hot (ie, potentially contaminated) and cold (ie, areas that are not contaminated).
• Have a well-trained medical care team. For highly communicable diseases (eg, Lassa, Ebola), ideally provide 3-step training: (1) basic individual training on
personal protective equipment donning and doffing (and including how to manage contamination of the environment from a spill and breach of the personal
protective equipment. Such training should be individualized to the specialty of the health care providers [ie, physician, nurse, respiratory therapist]); (2) team
training using mannequins; and (3) team training in the designated containment unit.
• Train team personnel on donning and doffing using an explicit written list of all donning and doffing steps.
• Screen and exclude health care personnel unable to wear the proper personal protective equipment. Consider excluding from the care team personnel at high risk
for disease acquisition or more severe illness, such as persons with nonintact skin, pregnancy, and immunocompromised persons. Consider excluding trainees from
providing care.
• Store an adequate supply of personal protective equipment.
• If needed, have dedicated point of care laboratory equipment.
• Develop a method to safely dispose of solid and liquid wastes.
• Restrict visitors (if indicated) and maintain a log of all visitors.
• Maintain a log of all health care personnel providing care.
• Develop a plan for managing health care personnel with unprotected exposure to the infectious agent (eg, needlestick).
• Assure that care team members receive proper rest.
approximately 24 outbreaks have occurred.59 The current out-
break, which began in 2014 in West Africa, has involved Guinea,
Sierra Leone, and Liberia. Caseswere also reported in Nigeria, Senegal,
Spain, Mali, United Kingdom, Italy, and the United States. As of Sep-
tember 24, 2015, there have been 28,355 total cases (15,235
laboratory-confirmed cases) and 11,311 deaths (case fatality rate,
approximately 40%). Moreover, for the first time, Ebola has crossed
international boundaries, involving Nigeria and Mali, and crossed
continents into Europe and North America. Four cases have been
acquired in the United States.
Clinical manifestations
EVD is characterized by the sudden onset of fever, headache,
myalgias, arthralgias of the large joints, and back pain.57,62 Typical-
ly, 2-3 days after the initial symptoms, gastrointestinal symptoms
occur, including abdominal pain, nausea, vomiting, and diarrhea.
A macular or maculopapular skin rash may appear on days 5-7 of
the disease. Hemorrhage is less common, occurring in only 15%-
20% of patients. Terminal cases develop disseminated intravascular
coagulation, septic shock, and multiorgan system failure.
Mortality ranges from 40%-90% and depends in part on the in-
fecting species. The Zaire species has the highest mortality (up to
90%) followed by the Sudan species (approximately 50%); Bundibugyo
species (approximately 40%), the Tai Forest species has a low mor-
tality (although only a single infected person has been reported)
and the Reston species causes subclinical infection in humans. Preg-
nant women have a higher mortality.
Diagnostic testing is achieved with the use of real-time PCR on
blood. Viral RNA is usually detectable by PCR between 3 and 10 days
after the onset of symptoms. Therefore, early in the course of illness,
diagnostic tests may be falsely negative. There are currently no ap-
proved therapies for Ebola; however, there are investigational
therapies, including immunoglobulins from recovered patients, hu-
manized monoclonal antibodies produced transgenically by using
the Nicotiana benthamiana plant, and a number of antiviral agents,
including adenosine analogues, viral RNA-dependent RNA poly-
merase inhibitors, and short interfering RNA.63,64 Additionally,
multiple vaccine platforms have been developed with some in clin-
ical trials.
Infection control issues
The highmortality of Ebola coupled with the low inoculated dose
required to initiate infection has led to a massive public health re-
sponse in the United States, including screening by public health
personnel of persons returned from epidemic countries in West
Africa, development of specialized Ebola treatment centers, and train-
ing of thousands of HCP in the use of specialized PPE to minimize
the risk of Ebola acquisition during patient care. Detailed recom-
mendations on screening for Ebola among potentially infected
returned travelers and management of patients with EVD are avail-
able on the CDC Web pages and in published articles.65-67
Given the high volume of diarrhea and vomiting and the poten-
tial for fomite transmission, environmental control is a critical issue
in the care of an Ebola-infected patient. Ebola virus may persist on
steel and plastic surfaces for >7 days.68,69 It may also persist in liquid
media for prolonged periods. Sodium hypochlorite (0.5% and 1%)
sterilized surfaces within 5 minutes, and 67% ethanol sterilized car-
riers at 5 minutes.68 A >4 log10 reduction of an Ebola strain was
achieved in 15 seconds using the following povidone iodine solu-
tions: 4%, 7.5%, 10%, and 3.2% iodine with 78% alcohol.70
Consistent use of appropriate PPE with strict adherence to
donning and doffing protocols is crucial to preventing acquisition
of EVD during patient care.65-67 A key component of reducing HCP
risk is proper training in PPE donning and doffingwith ongoing train-
ing to maintain competency.
SARS
Microbiology
SARSwas caused by a novel coronavirus, SARS-CoV, that was phy-
logenetically distinct from all previously known human and animal
coronaviruses.71 As with other coronaviruses, SARS-CoV is a positive-
strand RNA virus belonging to the family Coronaviridae.72 It is
classified as lineage 2B β CoV.
SARS-CoV–like viruses were detected in Himalayan palm civets
and a raccoon dog in a market in Southern China. The ultimate res-
ervoir is felt to be the Chinese horseshoe bat (Rhinolophus sinicus).
Epidemiology
The incubation period for SARS was 4.6 days, whereas the mean
time from symptom onset to hospitalization was 2-8 days.73 Human-
to-human transmission occurred most commonly via the droplet
route. SARS was also transmitted via contact (direct and indirect).
Airborne transmission may have occurred during aerosol generat-
ing procedures.
The attack rate for SARS-CoV ranged from 10%-60% or 2.4-31.3
cases per 1,000 exposure hours.74 Importantly, some patients ap-
peared to be superspreaders, with some cases transmitting SARS
to >100 contacts.
Outbreaks
SARS first appeared in Southern China in November 2002 and
was recognized as a global threat in March 2003 when it spread to
33 countries or regions on 5 continents and was contained by July
2013.75 SARS re-emerged in late 2003 and early 2004 in South China
after resumption of wild animal trading activities in markets. There
have been no reported cases since 2004. Overall, 8,098 people world-
wide became ill with SARS, of which 774 died (case fatality
rate = 9.6%). In the United States, only 8 persons had laboratory ev-
idence of SARS-CoV infection.
Independent risk factors of superspreading nosocomial out-
breaks included minimum distance between beds <1m (odds ratio
[OR], 6.98); washing or changing facilities for staff (OR, 0.12); per-
formance of resuscitation (OR, 3.81); staff workingwhile experiencing
symptoms (OR, 4.30); SARS patients requiring oxygen therapy (OR,
4.30); and SARS patients requiring noninvasive positive pressure ven-
tilation (OR, 11.82).73
Clinical manifestations
SARS generally began with a high fever (temperature >38.8°C)
and included headache and myalgias. Some people had mild re-
spiratory symptoms at the onset of illness. After 2-7 days, most
patients developed a dry cough. Diarrhea was present in 10%-20%
of cases. Laboratory abnormalities included lymphopenia, slightly
decreased platelet counts, prolonged coagulation profiles, andmildly
elevated serum hepatic enzymes.71
Overall mortality was 9.6%. Risk factors for death included age
>60 years, diabetes mellitus, hepatitis B infection, and higher viral
load.74,76
Infection control issues
The SARS epidemic exposed global weakness in infection control
practices. Overall, approximately 21% of infected persons were HCP,
but some areas, such as Hong Kong and Hanoi, experienced higher
rates of HCP infection (46% and 63%, respectively).75 The infection
control lessons learned from SARS have been reviewed.76-80 The risk
of developing SARSwas 12.6 times higher for those that did not wear
a mask during patient care activities.76 Other risk factors for acqui-
sition of infection by health care providers included contact with
respiratory tract secretions; exposure to body fluids of health care
providers’ eyes andmucousmembranes; inconsistent use of goggles,
gowns, and caps; and performing aerosol-generating procedures (in-
tubation, manual ventilation, chest physiotherapy, and suctioning).76
Inadequate patient placement in proper isolation rooms was also
a risk for nosocomial transmission. Handwashing was shown to be
protective in multiple studies.81
SARS-CoV was shown to survive in diarrheal stool samples for
4 days and in respiratory tract secretions for >7 days at room
temperature.82 Human coronavirus (HCoV 229E) was inactivated
within 1 minute by 2% glutaraldehyde, multiple quaternary am-
monium compounds, and multiple phenolics.83 Using human
coronavirus (HCoV229E), Sizun et al demonstrated survival of the
viruses on aluminum, sterile sponges, or latex surgical gloves for
>6 hours.84 Using transmissible gastroenteritis virus as a surrogate
for SARS, survival on isolation gownswas documented up to 24 hours
postinoculation.85
Data on inactivation of coronaviruses come primarily fromwork
with HCoV 229E, in which this virus is inactivated within 1 minute
by 2% glutaraldehyde, multiple quaternary ammonium com-
pounds, and multiple phenolics.83 It can also be inactivated within
1 minute by 10% povidone-iodine, 0.05% chlorhexidine gluconate,
and 70% alcohol.83 SARS-CoV was inactivated using a 5-minute ex-
posure time by 1:100 hypochlorite.82
MERS
Microbiology
The MERS is a new viral respiratory disease of humans first de-
scribed in 2012 and caused by a novel coronavirus (lineage 2C β
CoV).86-89 The microbiology, epidemiology, and clinical manifesta-
tions of SARS and MERS have been compared.72,90-92
Epidemiology
As of September 25, 2015, the following countries in the Middle
East have reported cases: Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. Countries with
travel-associated cases have included Algeria, Austria, China, Egypt,
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Malaysia, Netherlands, Philippines,
Republic of Korea, Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom, and the United
States. The United States has had only 2 travel-associated cases, both
of whomwere health care providers who lived and worked in Saudi
Arabia.87 No person-to-person transmission has been documented
in the United States.
MERS-CoV is a zoonotic disease that it transmitted from animals
to humans. The origins of the virus are not fully understood, but it
is believed to have originated in bats and then transmitted to camels.
Currently, it is believed that dromedary (single-humped) camels are
a major reservoir host for MERS-CoV and an animal source for
humans.
MERS may be transmitted from person to person. This occurs
most commonly when there is close contact, such as providing un-
protected care to an infected patient. Thus far, no sustained
community transmission has been documented. The R0 for MERS-
CoV is generally estimated to be <0.7, making sustained transmission
unlikely unless it mutates.91 Studies of family clusters and HCP con-
tacts of patients have reported low frequencies of transmission (ie,
1%-3%).93 However, increased transmission has occurred in health
care settings with limited infection control procedures.
The incubation period of MERS is approximately 5 days (range,
2-15 days).
Outbreaks
MERS has been epidemic in the Middle East in recent years. As
of September 11, 2015, the World Health Organization has re-
ported a total of 1,583 confirmed cases of MERS, with 566 deaths.
In the summer of 2015, a large outbreak of MERS was reported
in the Republic of Korea and China. As of September 11, 2015, the
World Health Organization reported that this outbreak involved 186
total confirmed cases (Republic of Korea: n = 185; China: n = 1), with
36 deaths. The last case of MERS infection in the Republic of Korea
that was reported to the World Health Organization was on July 4,
2015.
Clusters of cases have been reported in households and in health
care facilities, especially when infection prevention and control prac-
tices have been inadequate.94
Clinical manifestations
The clinical spectrum of MERS infection ranges from asymp-
tomatic or mild respiratory symptoms to severe acute respiratory
disease and death. Typical symptoms of MERS include fever, cough,
and shortness of breath. Pneumonia is common but not always
present. Gastrointestinal symptoms (vomiting and diarrhea) fre-
quently occur.
Risk factors for more severe disease include older age,
comorbidities (eg, chronic lung diseases, diabetes), and immuno-
suppression. The reported mortality is approximately 36%.
Currently, there are no specific therapies or vaccines available.
Infection control issues
Multiple outbreaks of MERS have involved health care
facilities.91,93,95-97 One outbreak involved 23 patients receiving he-
modialysis in an intensive care unit; the case fatality rate was 65%.
In the recent outbreak in South Korea, substantial transmission was
reported in health care facilities.98,99 For example, a hospital re-
ported a single primary case, 25 secondary cases, and 11 tertiary
cases.98
HCP have been at high risk of acquiring MERS. Al-Tawfiq and Perl
reported that of 952 cases reported in Saudi Arabia (June 2012-
September 2014), approximately 27%were HCP. Factors contributing
to intrahospital transmission include: (1) initial symptoms of MERS
are nonspecific leading to a failure to isolate the patient; (2) inad-
equate compliance with infection control practices; (3) inadequate
health care facilities (eg, overcrowding, close proximity of pa-
tients to cases); (4) use of aerosol-generating procedures; and (5)
prolonged viral shedding.93
Per the CDC, key methods for preventing transmission of MERS
in health care facilities include notifying patients to call before arrival
at a health care facility if they have had travel to the Middle East
plus signs and symptoms of MERS; strict adherence to respiratory
hygiene in clinics and the emergency department; early identifi-
cation of possible patients; and prompt institution of contact and
airborne isolation for possible cases.100
Similarities and differences between SARS and MERS
Similarities include the following: caused by coronaviruses of
animal origin; severe respiratory disease; global spread through in-
fected travelers; no effective therapies or vaccines; disease
transmission to family and HCP; and infection control in health care
facilities plays a critical role in limiting transmission.87 Differences
include the following: no evidence of sustained human-to-human
transmission of MERS-CoV; limited evidence of superspreaders of
MERS; slower global spread of MERS, likely because of lower in-
fectivity; and higher mortality of MERS compared with SARS (may
be an artifact of ascertainment).87
MERS-CoV has been shown to be recoverable after 48 hours on
steel or plastic washers (20°C and 40% relative humidity).101 Further,
no decrease in stability was observed during aerosolization experi-
ments. This study, studies on SARS-CoV (discussed previously), and
studies on other coronaviruses suggest that they survive on
environmental surfaces for a sufficient time to allow fomite
transmission.102
Studies on inactivation of SARS-CoV (previously discussed) and
other coronaviruses are inactivated within 1 minute by phenolics
(1.3-2.0 log10 reduction) and 70% ethanol (3.2-3.9 log10 reduction).103
Hypochlorite with a 1:00 dilution, had a 1 minute decrease of <1
log10.
Novel influenza A viruses
Background
Influenza A viruses are negative-sense RNA-enveloped viruses
which belong to the Orthomyxoviridae family and are the caus-
ative agents of influenza, a contagious respiratory viral disease of
birds and humans.104,105 Influenza A viruses are subdivided into dis-
tinct serotypes based on the genetic and antigenic properties of their
hemagglutinin and neuraminidase, the envelope glycoproteins ex-
pressed on the surface of virus particles which are responsible for
virus binding to relevant hosts and releasing newly formed infec-
tious virions, respectively.105 Sixteen hemagglutinin and 9
neuraminidase subtypes have been detected in wild aquatic birds
and poultry throughout the world, whereas new strains (H17-18
and N10-11) have been identified in bat species.105 Influenza A
viruses exhibit drift each year (minor changes) and occasional shifts
(major changes) which lead to pandemics. Influenza pandemics are
relatively rare; there have been only 4 in the last 100 years. Mul-
tiple influenza A pandemics are likely to have occurred in the last
4 centuries, including 3 in the 18th century, 4 in the 19th century,
3 in 20th century, and 1 in the 21st century.106 The first pandemic
of the 20th century occurred in 1918 because of the novel A(H1N1)
influenza virus, followed by pandemics in 1957 because of A(H2N20),
1968 because of A(H3N2), and 2009 because of novel A(H1N1).107
In addition, influenza A(H1N1) was reintroduced in 1977, whichmay
have been caused by a laboratory release. In the era before 1977,
there was only a single circulating strain of influenza causing sea-
sonal influenza in humans. Since 1977, both A(H1N1) and A(H3N2)
have circulated.
Avian influenza (bird flu) is an infectious disease of birds caused
by influenza A strains. The infection may cause disease in birds
ranging from mild illness, which may pass unnoticed, to a rapidly
fatal disease that can cause severe epidemics. Multiple subtypes of
influenza A of avian origin have been reported to cause human
disease in recent years, including H5N1, H6N1, H7N2, H7N3, H7N7,
H7N9, H9N2, H10N7, and H10N8.105,108-111 Of these, H5N1, H7N2, and
H7N3 have been responsible for human infections in North America.
Influenza pandemics (outbreaks that affect a large proportion of
the world because of a novel virus) are unpredictable but recur-
ring events that can have health, economic, and social consequences
worldwide. An influenza pandemic occurs when key factors con-
verge: an influenza virus emerges with the ability to cause sustained
human-to-human transmission, and the human population has little
to no immunity against the virus. With the growth of global trade
and travel, a localized epidemic can transform into a pandemic
rapidly, with little time to prepare a public health response.112
Avian influenza A subtypes with pandemic potential
Based on the number of cases reported and duration over which
these subtypes have been isolated, H5N1113-115 and H7N9113,114,116-118
are themost likely viruses to cause a newworldwide pandemic. Most
human cases of A(H5N1) and A(H7N9) infection have been asso-
ciated with direct or indirect contact with infected live or dead
poultry.
The A(H5N1) virus subtype, a highly pathogenic influenza A virus,
first infected humans in 1997 during a poultry outbreak in Hong
Kong. Since its widespread emergence in 2003 and 2004, A(H5N1)
has spread from Asia to Europe and Africa and has become en-
trenched in poultry in some countries. To date it has been reported
in 16 countries, infected >500 persons with a reported mortality
of approximately 60%. The incubation period for A(H5N1) is gen-
erally 2-8 days (maximum, 17 days), which is much longer than the
2- to 3-day incubation period for normal seasonal influenza. Other
known H5 subtypes include H5N2, H5N3, H5N4, H5N5, H5N6, H5N7,
H5N8, and H5N9.
The A(H7N9) virus subtype, is a low pathogenic influenza virus,
which first infected a few residents of Shanghai in March 2013. No
cases of A(H7N9) have been reported outside of China. Other known
H7 subtypes include H7N1, H7N2, H7N3, H7N5, H7N6, H7N7, and
H7N8. In humans, H7N2, H7N3, and H7N7 have causedmild tomod-
erate illness. H7H3 and H7N7 have caused mild to severe and fatal
illness. To date, >100 human cases of infection have been reported
with a high mortality. The incubation period for A(H7N9) is ap-
proximately 5 days (range, 2-8 days).
Initial symptoms of A(H5N1) and A(H7N9) include high fever,
usually with a temperature >38oC, and other influenza-like symp-
toms (cough or sore throat). Early symptoms may include diarrhea,
vomiting, abdominal pain, chest pain, and bleeding from nose or
gums. Characteristically, patients will develop lower respiratory tract
symptoms early, including respiratory distress and a hoarse voice.
Complications include hypoxemia, multiple organ dysfunction, and
secondary bacterial infections. The case fatality rate is much higher
than that of seasonal influenza.
Infection control
Avian influenza viruses are transmitted by close contact with in-
fected poultry. All hospitals should have plans in place to deal with
epidemic or pandemic influenza, especially if the influenza strain
is both highly pathogenic for humans and easily spread from person
to person.119-121 Influenza is transmitted by contact and droplet routes.
It is recommended to place patients with highly pathogenic influ-
enza viruses in hospital rooms meeting airborne isolation
requirements. HCP should wear gloves, an isolation gown, an N95
respirator (or powered air purifying respirator), and eye goggles or
face shield while providing care.
A(H5N1) placed on galvanized metal or glass persisted <1 day
at room temperature and with low or high humidity.122 However,
at low temperatures (<10°C), A(H5N1) persisted for up to 13 days.
A(H5N1) was susceptible to hypochlorite solutions with 15
seconds.123,124
Currently, circulating influenza A strains are susceptible to the
neuraminidase inhibitors, including A(H5N1).125 However, because
circulating strains of A(H1N1) in 2008 exhibited resistance, onemust
be concerned that in the future, circulating influenza strains may
develop resistance to neuraminidase inhibitors. Vaccines are avail-
able for A(H5N1) but not for A(H7N9).
CONCLUSIONS
Over the last several decades, we have witnessed the emer-
gence of many new infectious agents, some of which aremajor public
threats. All health care facilities need to have policies and plans in
place for early identification of patients with a highly communi-
cable disease, immediate isolation, and proper management to
prevent transmission to HCP, other patients, and visitors to the health
care facility.
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